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Research on relationship lending focuses attention on economic factors which influence 
the relationships between SMEs’ owners/managers and banks but no previous work has 
focused on the role of trust. Trust is expected to reduce transaction costs and agency 
costs, reduce the perceived credit risk and, thus, influence credit availability. Trustwor-
thiness is associated with three attributes of SME owner managers’ namely; ability, be-
nevolence and integrity. It is hypothesised that lending managers’ assessment of the 
trustworthiness of SME owner managers affects the ability of SMES to gain the credit. 
Trustworthiness is hypothesised as positively associated with credit access in contrast to 
lower trustworthiness which is associated with credit constraint. Use of overdraft is con-
sidered here as indicator of credit constraint. The data were obtained from a survey of 
lending managers from banks in North East Italy. Control variables and a vector of 
trustworthiness factors were collected on a random sample of borrowers, resulting in a 
sample of 535 firms. Results from regression analysis found evidence that firms enjoy-
ing high level of trust are able to access the credit they need and therefore are less credit 
constrained. Some implications of these results for banks, owner managers and future 
research are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: Trust, Risk, Relationship lending, SMEs, Credit Constrained, Needed Credit 
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1. Introduction 
 
The banking system is essential for the life of firms and especially for small and me-
dium enterprises as they do not have access to capital markets.  The implementation of 
Basel 2 agreement has implications for the relationship between firms and banks (for a 
general review see Sironi & Zazzara, 2003). To maintain the credit quality of standards 
of their loan portfolio banks should supplement the data based analysis of firm’s credit-
worthiness with the relationship based insights in to firm’s credibility.  Consequently, 
the research on the relationship between banks and firms continues to attract scholarly 
attention which is increasing as shown by survey some recent research. 
 
Lending process is very complex and substantially involves the risk evaluation of the 
firms. Banks rely on different lending technologies and tend to use more than one tech-
nology at a time (Berger & Udell, 2006). Among the various lending technologies, rela-
tionship lending has a peculiar role. In relationship lending, the bank relies on a variety 
of private information gathered through contact with the firm, its owner, and the local 
community in order to evaluate the firm riskiness (see seminal works by Petersen & Ra-
jan, 1994, 1995 and Berger & Udell, 1995). Thus, on one hand the personal ties can 
help banks to deal with SMEs opaqueness and the related difficulty in valuing firm 
riskiness; on the other small businesses can be better off because easier access to credit. 
Previous research on relationship lending focuses attention on a set of variables in order 
to catch the effect of the relationship such as the length of the relationship, its closeness, 
the concentration of lending relationships on few banks, the quality of the relationship 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995, Berger & Udell, 1995, Angelini et al., 1998, Harhoff & 
Körting, 1998, Detragiache, et al., 2000, Berger, et al. 2001, Lehmann & Neuberger, 
2001, Stanton, 2002, Akhavein et al., 2004, Elsas, 2005, Agarwal & Hauswald, 2008). 
When a bank makes a decision to provide credit, even though it is a contractual rela-
tionship, it is underpinned by an assessment of trust. From an etymological point of 
view, the word credit derives from the Latin noun creditum which is translated as a loan 
or a thing entrusted to another; the related Latin verb credere means to believe, to trust, 
entrust but also to provide credit (Castiglioni and Mariotti, 1981). Underpinning the po-
tential creditor’s analysis of the risk return trade-off is an assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of the borrower. Literature on trust stresses that high levels of trust are purported to 
encourage trustworthy behaviour (Nooteboom, 2003) and that trust can play an impor-
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tant role in reducing agency problems such as moral hazard, adverse selection, in cut-
ting cut transaction costs (Macaulay, 1963, Nooteboom et al., 1997) as well as the ex-
penses of monitoring and control (see Lewicki et al. 1998). Thus, trusting relationship 
can benefit banks and SMEs. This is not a utopian view of the world and the benefits of 
increasing levels of trustworthiness could include increase credit gained. This is theo-
retically supported by the model proposed by Howorth and Moro (2006). However, the 
role of trust has remained relatively under-investigated, although in recent times a grow-
ing interest is emerging (see, for instance, Saparito et al., 2001 and Ferrary, 2003). 
 
Present study analyses whether bank managers’ perceived trustworthiness of the small 
business owner-managers is associated with accessing all the credit the firms needs, that 
is whether trust avoids to constrain credit. In addition, the study is focussed on two sub-
regions of Italian North East where the banking industry environment is different for 
competition and structure and where there different support is given to the SMEs by the 
local governments. The research question is tested using a vector of measures of trust-
worthiness derived from previous studies, in particular from Mayer et al. (1995) and 
uses a unique dataset collected during the period 2004-2007. Econometric findings sup-
port our preposition, discovering a negative relationship between trust and constraining 
credit: by leveraging trust, banks can help the growth and development of small firms. 
At the same time, entrepreneurs can only gain real advantages when they develop 
strong, long term and trusting ties with the banks and the bank managers. 
The present paper is organised as follows: section 2 illustrates the literature on relation-
ship lending and section 3 enters trust as an independent variable. Section 4 illustrates 
the research question and section 5 the research methods. Section 6 explains how the 
variables are operationalised while section 7 describes the sample used in the research. 
In section 9 the research question is tested and the findings are commented in section 9. 
Section 10 concludes. 
 
2. Banks and SMEs 
 
Banks play a key role in financing the firms as they tend to leverage bank debt in pref-
erence of equity. Interestingly, the wide use of bank debt to finance firms and projects is 
not context specific: one finds it for large firms and small ones; in Continental Europe 
as well as in Japanese and Anglo-Saxon world. The importance of the topic justifies and 
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explains the huge amount of research that has been carried out on bank lending both at 
large corporation and SMEs level. 
 
Research on lending argues that the lending technologies can be grouped into four main 
categories (Berger & Udell, 2002): financial statement lending (based on the evaluation 
of information from the financial statement); asset based lending (based on the provi-
sion of collateral and its quality); credit scoring lending (based on statistical tech-
niques); relationship lending. The first three lending techniques are usually grouped to-
gether and labelled transaction lending because the riskiness evaluation is based on 
available factual and public information, collected independently from the quality of the 
relationship and include loans that are mainly spot-like and for non recurrent needs. Re-
lationship lending is different from transaction lending because it is based on recurrent 
needs and focuses on the fact that the improvements in the relationships between banks 
and businesses can help the banks in evaluating firms’ riskiness increasing credit avail-
ability, reducing the cost of credit and the pledging of collateral, accordingly (Agarwal 
& Hauswald, 2008). In addition it increases the repayment rate of the loan (Brown & 
Zehnder, 2007). intrusiveness of control and monitoring. In reality, the different lending 
technologies are not mutually exclusive as banks tend to use more than one technology 
at a time (Berger & Udell, 2006). In relationship lending, a key role is played by a vari-
ety of private information, which results from strong and long-term relationships (Ange-
lini et al., 1998; Berger, et al., 2001). According to the quoted literature, Berger (1999) 
summarises the three main characteristics of relationship lending: the information is 
gathered beyond the relatively transparent data available in the official documents; in-
formation gathering is through a continuous process; information remains confidential 
to the provider of funds who uses it as a basis for taking other decisions. 
 
Because of its nature, relationship lending is complex but it is also worthwhile for the 
bank. As summed up by Boot (2000), it is a valuable source of information, leaving 
room for flexibility and discretion. It transforms loans that are worthless in the short run 
into worthwhile ones. Indeed, the mass of information gathered over a period of time, 
gives the bank an opportunity to exploit economies of knowledge in the long run. As 
modelled by Boot and Thakor (2000), relationship lending partially insulates the bank 
from pure price competition, although it is costly and in competitive markets banks tend 
to use it less frequently. At the same time, relationship lending technology implies a dif-
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ferent structure at bank level: the portfolio should not be constructed by a large number 
of small value loans, since this has an adverse effect on the manager’s ability to monitor 
them (Stanton, 2002); the bank has to delegate more lending authority to the local loan 
officers than for transaction based lending (Stein, 2002) and they become the repository 
of the information about the firm, its statute and the evaluation, giving them a lot of ad-
ditional power. Yet, this delegation raises agency problems and, consequently, banks 
that rely more on relationship lending are expected to spend more resources on internal 
monitoring activity. 
Since the beginning, relationship lending research pays particular attention to small 
firms (Petersen & Rajan, 1994 and 1995) because they are informationally opaque 
(Berger et al. 2001) and therefore their lending process is more profoundly affected by 
relationship. Later research (for instance, Binks & Ennew, 1997, Harhoff & Körting, 
1998 but also Akhavein et al., 2004) not only confirms this point but it expands the re-
search on the factors that affect relationship lending. 
 
2.1 Relationship Lending: What Influences It 
 
One of the main factors that determine the quality of a relationship is the time spent in 
producing and collecting information. Scholars have approached the problem by look-
ing at both the length of the relationship and the age of the firm. In fact, only the former 
provides the lender with private information since the latter gives just access to a greater 
amount of public information. There is evidence that the probability of gaining credit 
increases with the age of the firm (Angelini et al., 1998, Akhavein et al., 2004). Newer 
and smaller firms are considered to be the riskiest: they have to gain market shares, 
have to survive the start up period of getting established, do not have much of a track 
record. Moreover, the potential lender is uncertain about the competence, skills and 
trustworthiness of the management as well as the kind of investment opportunities that 
could arise (Petersen & Rajan, 1994, Berger & Udell, 1994). As they become more es-
tablished and gain reputation, the information about the firm increases and it is easier 
for the bank system to evaluate the creditworthiness of the firm (Berlin, 1996). 
 
A long relationship provides banks with great amount of private information giving 
them the possibility to discriminate between firms with poor track records and those that 
present moral hazard and adverse selection risks (Diamond, 1984, Berger, et al., 2005). 
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Greater accessibility to credit is also available because of pre-existing relationships – 
not necessarily linked with previous lending – such as savings accounts as well as fi-
nancial management: such relationships provide the bank with additional information to 
evaluate firm riskiness such as management competence and capability in running the 
firm and mainly in dealing with the financial issues (Degryse & Van Cayseele, 2000). 
Thus, firms with longer relationships are expected to gain more credit because they con-
sidered to be less risky and are less credit constrained accordingly. A firm is credit con-
strained when it gains less credit with respect to what it needs. 
Relationship is also a matter of closeness: “if scale economies exist in information pro-
duction, and information is durable and not easily transferable, […] a firm with close 
ties to financial institutions should have […] greater availability of funds relative to 
firms without such ties” (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). A large body of empirical evidence 
(for Italy see Castelli et al., 2006) as well as theoretical models (Dell’Ariccia & 
Marquez, 2004) support this point. 
The value of private information depends on its gathering on one (or few) collector(s), 
as the greater the concentration, the more complete the information, the smaller the 
agency problems and moral hazard risks. Borrowing from multiple banks not only may 
generate higher costs for the firm but it may also be informationally inefficient for small 
businesses, those who suffer more acute asymmetric information problems (Berger, et 
al., 2001). Concentration of credit can also have negative facets as it can create a situa-
tion of information monopoly for the bank (Sharpe, 1990, Fama, 1985). The difficulties 
in conveying an accurate picture of their performance, the time required to look for and 
evaluate potential new banks and the administrative effort involved in switching, is ex-
pected to represent a very high cost for smaller firms and “if firms are trapped within 
sub-optimal bank relationships, and they are unable to obtain alternative sources of fi-
nance, they could face credit constraints” (Howorth et al. 2003). Thus, Detragiache, Ga-
rella and Guiso (2000) argue that the choice between one or more banks depends on the 
balance between the benefits of reduced cost linked to one bank relationship and the 
cost of facing problems in refinancing the firm, that is the risk to be credit constrained. 
Establishing multiple relationships insulate the firm since it serves to increase the prob-
ability that at least one relationship bank with private information about the firm will be 
able to refinance the projects of the firm, thus reducing the probability of early liquida-
tion. 
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Relationship lending is a matter of quality of information where the higher its quality, 
the easier for the bank to evaluate the riskiness of the firm, the easier the access of 
credit for the firm (Elsas, 2005). Elsas and Krahnen (1998), by looking at the German 
market and differentiating between “house-bank” and “non-house-bank” where the for-
mer is defined as the bank that has more intensive information than an analogous aver-
age bank, discover that the house-banks are more supportive of the firm avoiding credit 
reduction with downgrading, and increasing its availability with upgrading. Lehmann 
and Neuberger (2001), by looking at a set of variables that measure the interaction ac-
tivity between bank manager and the entrepreneur, find a positive correlation with credit 
availability (i.e. greater interaction is associated to more credit). 
 
Bank dimension can also impact on relationship lending since large banks do business 
in more impersonal ways relying more on accounting records to evaluate firm risk (Ber-
ger et al., 2005). It is worth noting that the relationship between small businesses’ ac-
cess to finance on one hand and bank size - bank complexity on the other is ambiguous. 
On one hand, larger and more complex banks look for lending opportunities to small 
businesses as these firms provide them with the possibility of exploiting portfolio diver-
sification benefits and economies of scale on monitoring activity (when loans are based 
on facts and figures). On the other, bank size and complexity can generate diseconomies 
relative to managing and monitoring small loans as well as difficulties in managing ef-
fectively the flow of soft information leveraging it in order to evaluate firm risk. Re-
search tends to support the latter aspect, stressing the important role of small banks on 
small firms lending. From this perspective, small banks’ short lines of command and 
communication reduce internal agencies and control problems by also reducing transac-
tion costs. Thus, from the strategic point of view, small banks are profitable when they 
differentiate from large ones instead of mirroring large banks’ strategies (De Young & 
Duffy 2002) because of their peculiarities in evaluating SMEs risk and dealing with it. 
Large and small banks should therefore specialise in loans of different dimensions with 
a positive correlation between bank size and firm size (Petersen, 2002, Stein, 2002). 
 
3. Introducing Trust as a Core Independent Variable 
 
As shown in the literature review provided, previous studies on lending relationships do 
not consider trust among covariates. To the best of our knowledge, only two of them 
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consider it as one of the independent variables (Harhoff & Körting, 1998, Ferrary, 
2003) but they do not pay too much attention to its characteristics or to different aspects 
of trust. Trust as a variable is far too important to be overlooked (for a general review 
see Nooteboom, 2002). Bromiley and Harris (2006) argue that excluding trust from 
lending relationship models partially reduces the explanatory power of the models. En-
tering trust shifts the attention from the traditional approach linked to transaction costs 
economics and agency theory to a wider (and more complex) approach where interper-
sonal ties and relationship are taken into consideration (Barney, 1990). 
The importance of trust in human relations is highlighted by various authors. The exten-
sive literature on trust emphasizes that its presence reduces agency problems (Ring & 
Van den Ven 1992, Wicks et al., 1999, Zaheer et al., 1998); cuts transaction costs 
(Macaulay, 1963, Nooteboom et al., 1997); reduces expenses of monitoring and control 
(Lewicki & Bunker 1996, Lewicki, et al., 1998, Lewis & Weigart, 1985, McAllister 
1995, Zand, 1972); decreases the use of legalistic remedies (Sitkin & Roth, 1993); im-
proves relationships (Fisman & Khanna, 1999, Deutsch, 2000); supports cooperation 
(Das & Teng, 1998, Doz, 1996, Dasgupta, 2000, Harris & Dibben, 1999, Jones & 
George 1998); aids decision taking in a situation where information is scarce (Luhmann, 
2000). Trust is closely linked to ethics, it is culturally specific (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1994) and is a construct common to various disciplines from sociology and psychology, 
to economics, and organisational relations (for a review on this topic see Rousseau, et 
al., 1998). The multidisciplinary interest in trust implies different approaches to analys-
ing it. As a consequence, different forms of trust are identified, the differences being 
determined by the particular situation, background and history of the relationship. Al-
though scholars tend to use different names and specifics, forms of trust can be summed 
up as in: 
• deterrence based trust (e.g. Ring & Van Den Ven, 1992) (although somebody has 
raised the question whether this is trust at all); 
• calculus based trust (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) which is based on rational 
choice, 
• relational based trust (e.g. McAllister, 1995), that is based on repeated interaction 
over time; 
• identification based trust (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996); 
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• institution based trust (e.g. Ring & Van Den Ven, 1992) which is based on ex ante 
deterrents such as reputation, support from critical mass, etc.; 
• conditional- and unconditional-based trust (e.g. Jones & George, 1998); 
• weak trust based on limited possibilities of opportunism, semi-strong trust when 
vulnerabilities are protected by various governance devices, and strong trust when 
it is based on shared values, principles and standards (e.g. Barney & Hansen, 1994). 
Trust must not be confused with confidence which implies that one does not consider 
the alternative opportunities, or with reliance which is simply dependent on the proven 
capability. Trust requires a previous engagement of one person and presupposes a situa-
tion of risk where the damage is greater than the advantage. In addition, situation of uni-
lateral dependence such as those of “lock in” because of information capturing 
(Howorth et al., 2001), cannot be considered trusting relationships. Mayer, Davies and 
Schoorman (1995) present a useful definition of trust which shows trust is willingness 
to accept the consequences of placing trust in a trustee: 
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based 
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor and control that other party”  
(Mayer et al., p. 712, 1995). 
Since there no single universally accepted definition of trust it makes difficult to meas-
ure trust. Discovering the determinants of trust is not an easy task because if trust is 
identified with a subjective probability that the trusted party will not abuse the trust put 
in by the trustee, anything that contributes to this subjective probability would belong to 
trust (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Mayer et. al., (1995) provide one framework to model 
the relationship based lending behaviour that incorporates trust. Howorth and Moro 
(2006) adapted Mayer et. al., (1995) model. This study follows the Howorth and Moro 
(2006) model (Figure 1). 
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The perception of another’s trustworthiness underpins the trust that exists between 
them. The focus here is on factors that influence the lending managers’ assessments of 
trustworthiness. Mayer, Davies and Schoorman (1995) suggest that trustworthiness is 
based on three factors: ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability looks at aspects such 
as skills and competence, it is domain specific and it cannot necessarily be generalised 
to other situations. Trust in the owner manager’s business ability will reduce the bank 
manager’s perceived risk about the likelihood of failure, that is that the entrepreneur 
will be able to repay principal and interest. Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee 
is voluntarily believed to do good to the trustor. Often, benevolence is viewed as rela-
tionship specific. The definition of benevolence in owner/manager – bank relationships 
is extended to a general willingness to voluntarily do good to others, in line with Noote-
boom et al.’s (1997) habitualization. In the bank – owner/manager relationship benevo-
lence can play an important role since it can increase the expectation of the bank man-
ager that the SMEs owners/managers will act to meet all the obligations (repayment 
plans, covenants, etc.) because of the personal ties between bank manager and SMEs 
owners/managers. In other words, high level of benevolence reduces the perceived 
riskiness of the SMEs owners/managers. Integrity is the perception that the trustee ad-
heres to a set of principles considered acceptable to the trustor. Integrity (i.e. morality 
and ethical principles) is not linked to skills or competences (morality is not a matter of 
knowledge or skills) nor is it relationship specific (morality is over and above each kind 
of specific relationship). Integrity is thus quite intrinsic part of individual’s commit-
ments to moral principles making integrity a personal characteristic of owner/manager. 
In lending relationships integrity can help to reduce the expectation of moral hazard, as 
well as increasing the perceived reliability of information supplied by the SMEs own-
ers/managers. 
The three elements of trustworthiness will contribute to an assessment of the trustwor-
thiness of each SME owner/manager that is context, relationship and person specific. 
Earlier research has found it difficult to distinguish empirically between components of 
trust, particularly benevolence and integrity (Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 
1997) and it has been suggested that perceptions of trustworthiness draw on all these 
factors with varying degrees of emphasis depending on the context. 
Other factors that are expected to influence assessments of trustworthiness include the 
trustor’s propensity to trust which is based on a general belief in humanity that a trustor 
is better off (McKnight et al., 1998). From the banking point of view, bank managers 
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with high propensity to trust can facilitate access to credit although the bank internal 
procedures as well as the laws, conventions and norms on bank lending can frustrate it. 
In addition, contextual and situational factors can affect trust formation since the trus-
tor’s perception and interpretation of the context of the relationship affects both the 
need for trust and the evaluation of trustworthiness. 
 
3.1 Trust in Lending Relationships 
 
The trust which is bestowed on SMEs owners/managers is expected to be based on an 
assessment of the SMEs owners/managers’ integrity, benevolence and ability which will 
have been made by way of the individual cognitive process of trust formation of the 
trustor, in this case, of the bank manager. This process will be influenced by the propen-
sity to trust and the emotional base of the bank manager, among other characteristics. 
The trust formation process will be influenced by the SMEs owners/managers’ charac-
teristics insofar as they are known or understood by the bank manager. Therefore previ-
ous interactions, shared values, community involvement, secondary and third party 
sources of information will all influence trust formation through the bank manager’s 
processing of that information about the SMEs owners/managers. It is therefore clear 
that trust can play a very important role in valuing risk, helping to gain all the credit the 
firm need that is reducing the risk to be credit constrained. The core role played by trust 
factors (that is ability, benevolence and integrity) emerges clearly. Consequently, the 
present research focuses on the role played by trustworthiness factors on credit facility 
availability as it will be explained in the hypotheses section. 
 
4 Research question 
 
The literature about trust points out its relevance as a mean of reducing transaction and 
agency costs. At the same time, literature on relationship lending stresses the impor-
tance of agency issues and moral hazard reduction to reduce risk and improve credit 
availability. Interestingly, a general question arises when comparing the two streams of 
research i.e. what is the impact of trust on the lending relationships between banks and 
small firms owners/managers? More specifically, does trust increase credit facility ac-
cess guaranteeing the firm the funds it needs? 
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As illustrated above, the trust which is bestowed on SMEs owners/managers is expected 
to be based on an assessment of the SMEs owners/managers’ integrity, benevolence and 
ability which will have been made by way of the individual cognitive process of trust 
formation of the trustor, in this case, of the bank manager. 
Because of the trust formation process and what affects it, trust can influence and im-
prove the access to credit, in line with Harhoff and Körting’s (1998) work. Thus, 
Howorth and Moro (2006) develop a proposition that states “The supply of bank funding is 
positively related to bank manager’s trust.”  This study investigates whether the proposi-
tion is supported by econometric analysis of empirical data. The choice of method is 
explained in the following section. 
 
5. Research Method 
 
We use both qualitative and quantitative approaches in this study. Measurement of trust 
was carried out using a survey of perceptions and actions of lending bank managers. 
Having measured the trust this measure is used along with other variables to carry out a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of these variables on the level of funds used by firms 
through credit facility with the banks. The findings were discussed with a panel of 
SMEs owners/managers and bank managers.  
 
The data on attributes of trust was collected using a survey filled in by the bank man-
ager. The main body of the survey was aimed at collecting information on managerial 
and financial aspects of the firm along with various indicators of three attributes of in-
tegrity, ability and benevolence which together constituted a measure of trust as is ex-
plained below. 
 
Factor Analysis is employed to test whether trust could be derived from the vector of 
trust attributes. The research question is then investigated using ordinary least squares 
with a bootstrapped estimation of the standard errors. The bootstrap technique in esti-
mating standard errors of the dependent variable provides an estimate of the standard 
errors that is not linked to assumptions regarding the probability distribution of the 
population (Efron, 1979). In other words, it is a robust system to estimate the standard 
errors and significance level in general and specifically for the regression covariates. 
Efron and Tibshirani (1998) state that the bootstrap technique relieves the analyst of 
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having to make non parametric assumptions about the form of the underlying popula-
tion when used in a non parametric mode and it provides more accurate answers than 
standard approaches when used in a parametric mode. In addition, it can provide an-
swers where no textbook formula exists. 
 
6. Operationalisation of the variables 
 
The relationship between dependent, independent and control variables is reported I 
figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Dependent Variable 
 
It is not easy to measure whether a firm is credit constrained or not. In general terms, it 
is a matter of entrepreneur and/or manager perception. At the same time, the higher the 
level of credit used with respect the overall credit provided by the bank, the higher the 
probability to be credit constrained that is to face problem in addressing payments or in 
matching expected growth targets. In addition, when the firm is using more than the 
credit provided by the bank, it is definitely credit constrained. Thus, we operationalise 
Independent 
Variable 
Trustworthiness 
Factor 
- Integrity 
- Ability 
- Benevolence 
TRUST 
Form and 
strength 
Cognitive 
Process of 
Trust  
Formation 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Used 
overdraft 
Control 
Variables 
- firm characteris-
tics 
- relation charac-
teristics 
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the dependent variable using the percentage of average used overdraft debt with respect 
the overdraft provided by the bank. The higher the value of the dependent variable 
(OVUSE) the higher the probability that the firm is credit constrained. 
 
6.2 Independent Variable 
 
Trust is measured according to a vector of 10 items that measure the three trust factors 
as identified by looking at the conceptual framework. The bank’s manager had to evalu-
ate the items on a 5 point Likert-type scale between “I totally disagree” (1) to “I totally 
agree” (5). Each item was based on previous trust inventories (e.g. Cummings & 
Bromiley, 1995, Currall & Judge, 1995) as well as items previously developed accord-
ing to the proposed model, since they gave reliable results (see Mayer & Davies, 1999, 
Jarvenpaa et al., 1998). Each item was critically evaluated and the fact that the vector of 
items is requested to measure trustworthiness factors in the financial context was taken 
into consideration. Table 1 list the items. They are reduced to one TRUST factor using 
factor analysis. The factor is expected to be negatively related to OVUSE since the 
higher the trust, the higher the probability that the firm could gain all the credit it needs. 
If the firm gain all the credit it needs, it will have a bigger cushion that is a greater mar-
gin of available, unused credit that is a lower OVUSE. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The entrepreneur knows very well the market in which he/she operates ABI1 
The entrepreneur is good at selecting the needed resources ABI2 
The entrepreneur is good at managing the resources ABI3 
The entrepreneur is good at understanding market evolution ABI4 
The entrepreneur adapts his/her interests with those of his/her  
commercial partners 
BE(1 
The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of his/her employees BE(2 
The entrepreneur is very involved in the community BE(3 
The entrepreneur is totally honest during negotiations with commercial  
partners 
I(T1 
The entrepreneur is consistent in his /her behavior and decisions I(T2 
I(T3 
Ability 
Benevolence 
Integrity 
If you know that the entrepreneur is looking for a personal assistant,  
Would you suggest a female friend to apply to the firm? 
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6.3 Control Variables 
 
The credit availability is a function of the market concentration proxied by the 
number of banks operating in a region (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). The greater the com-
petition among banks the greater the dispersion of information among them. Therefore, 
in concentrated markets, it is easier to raise finance for younger, smaller, marginal firms 
and they are expected to be less credit constrained. In the regressions the number of the 
banks that operate in each municipality are entered (N_BANKS) and a positive relation 
is expected. The study focuses on two different regions. A dummy variable (REGION) 
is included where 1 represents Friuli Venezia Giulia. Firms in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
have less access to grants and public sources of finance and are less protected than those 
in South Tyrol. In addition, in Friuli firms face more competition from firms which 
have headquarters outside of the region. For this reasons, firms in Friuli are expected to 
be more dependent on bank funding. This covariate gives the possibility to control for 
the system risk at local level and a positive relationship is expected since in South Tyrol 
(0) the firms are expected to rely less on bank credit. Since the dataset provides data 
from local and large banks a dummy variable (LOC_NAT) is used to control for the 
kind of bank. Large banks (1) are supposed to be less supportive and consequently a 
positive relation with the dependent variable is expected. The interest rate on overdraft 
(INT_OV) paid by the firm is expected to be positively related to OVUSE. Indeed, the 
higher the cost of the facility, the lower the interest of the firm in using it since it im-
pacts on firm’s overall financial performance. 
In general terms, a positive correlation between being credit constrained and risk is ex-
pected since a negative  relationship between credit access and risk is expected (Berger 
& Udell, 1995). The first covariate that tries to measure the risk (at systemic level) is 
ECON. It is an index collected by Bank of Italy in accordance to the European Central 
Bank, which measures the expected change in providing credit to customers. It is im-
plicitly a measure of the change in perceived risk linked to change in economic climate. 
It is collected every three months through a survey administered to bank managers (no 
one of them is involved in the research) where they have to score on a five Likert-Type 
scale between -1 (relaxing approach in providing credit to customers) and +1 (more 
rigid approach in providing credit to customers). The values used are those collected by 
Bank of Italy in the quarter when the data were collected in each bank. Since positive 
values are associated to a more stringent credit policy, a positive relationship between 
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ECON and OVUSE is expected. In fact, more stringent credit policy implies either re-
fusal to provide additional credit or possible reduction of the overall credit provided to 
the firms increasing the average used credit accordingly. Riskiness is also linked to firm 
dimension: bigger firms need more finance on one hand and are considered less risky on 
the other. In addition, they have greater negotiation power as found by Lehmann and 
Neuberger (2001). In the regressions, the size of the firm is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the annual turnover, in line with previous empirical research 
(LN_TURNOVER) and a positive relation is expected. The covariate that cope with the 
riskiness of the credit provided is the COLLATERAL. Indeed, collateral is a way to 
hedge the loss at default and to deal with various issues such as moral hazard and ad-
verse selection (probability of default). The covariate is expected to be negatively corre-
lated to OVUSE since the existence of collateral should increase the access of credit 
reducing the possibility to be credit constrained. 
We decided to avoid traditional variables to control for the quality of the firm. In fact, 
neither the profit nor the assets are entered in the regression. The decision is linked with 
the poor quality of this data (Moro et al., 2009): they are strongly affected by the ac-
counting standard used by Italian SMEs and by accounting creativity. Since there is no 
substantial difference between pre-tax profit and tax base, profit is strongly affected by 
minimising the overall amount of taxes the firm has to pay. Assets are usually depreci-
ated as fast as possible (according to tax law) in order to reduce taxes as much as possi-
ble. Assets are re-valued only occasionally. As a matter of fact, figures given in the bal-
ance sheet are a very poor representation of the real value of the assets and SMEs usu-
ally have big hidden reserves (Moro et al., 2009). This point is supported by the com-
ments of the bank managers. They cannot rely on book value of the assets and when 
they need an estimate of the value of the assets, they have to ask for a survey produced 
by chartered surveyors. Typically, the figures provided are very different with respect 
what is recorded in the books. 
The relationship provides the banks with additional information that helps to increase 
the knowledge of the firm and the general context as well. As pointed out by some theo-
retical models, borrowing constraints become less strict with time because of the in-
creased reputation of the borrower (Martinelli, 1997). At the same time, when firms are 
small, they can face hold up problems (Howorth et al., 2003). In line with the previous 
empirical research the log of the length of the relationship (LN_LENGTH) is entered in 
the regression. Because the characteristics of the firms (SMEs) a positive relationship is 
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expected to occur since the bank capture effect is likely to prevail over the information 
production effect. If the firm has more than a simple lending relation with the bank, it 
has the possibility to give the bank a lot of additional information about firm perform-
ance. MULTI is a dummy variable that control for it. When the information is held by 
few or even only one bank manager, information dissipation is reduced: a positive rela-
tionship between the number of people involved in the relationship at bank level 
(MANAGERS) and being credit constrained is expected. At the same time, the lending 
relationship is influenced by bank manager perception of facing a situation with reduced 
information asymmetry. Previous research (Berger et al., 2001) stresses the importance 
of the frequency the bank manager meets firms: this increases the acquisition of private 
information and helps in better evaluating firm’s risk and, from the firm point of view, 
in accessing credit (FREQ_MEET). The same effect is expected for FREQ_REV which 
measure the reviewing activity. 
 
7. Sample Data 
 
The research focuses mainly on local community banks that have the legal form of the 
Banche di Credito Cooperativo. The decision to pay attention to them is twofold: previ-
ous research stresses local banks’ role in affecting national growth (Usai & Vannini, 
2005); they are very small, are local and have strong ties with the community. The sam-
ple is represented by six Raiffeisenkassen and two Banche di Credito Cooperativo. In 
addition, data was collected from local branches of two large national banks. 
A sample of non agricultural SMEs firms was created for each bank. The firm is con-
sidered to be an SME according to the European Community standards, i.e. firms with a 
turnover smaller than 50 million Euros and with less than 250 employees. The sample 
was built up randomly and represents between 10% and 20% of the overall number of 
firms that had a credit facility with the bank (in terms of both short-term and long-term 
debt) in the case of local bank while for large national banks the sample represents less 
than 1% of the entire population and around 5% of the local population of customers. 
The agricultural firms were excluded from the sample because of the uniqueness of the 
sector: the firms are quite small, in the form of the sole trader and, among them, there 
are a large number of part time farmers. In addition, the agricultural sector is widely 
supported by grants of the local governments. These aspects can bias the results. The 
initial list contains 535 firms which provided a final dataset of 457 useful observations 
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(85.44%) with a turnover between 13,000 Euros and 46,900,000 Euros. The overall re-
sponse rate is homogeneous among the different banks. Summary of  the data is re-
ported in table 2. 
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Average turnover of sample firms is €2.2 million. The relationship is widely concen-
trated in few persons since on average the firms have contact with 1.6 persons inside 
each bank. The average used overdraft is 60.67%. The loans given to the firms of the 
sample are also widely collateralised (81.53%) but differences are found in the collater-
alisation since 24.78% of the credit is collateralised with firm assets while 80.26% is 
pledged with personal guarantees (clearly there are many facilities that are collateralised 
with both firms assets and personal guarantees). 
 
The length of the relationship is 10.34 years on average, with the longest one of 35 
years. The frequency distribution of the length of the relationship has the mode in the 
class 10 years (28.66% of the obs). More than 25% of the observations has a relation-
ship shorter than 4 years, 44% of the sample has a relationship shorter than 9 years 
while 75% is shorter than 12 years: the SMEs’ owners/managers tend to establish long 
term relationships with the bank. Bank managers’ revision the firms’ line of credit once 
in a year in 9.62% of the observations, while the revision is carried out on semi-annual 
basis in 76.58% of the observations. Bank managers meet 19.91% of the SMEs own-
ers/managers once a year and 52.95% of the customers at least four times in a year. 
These data suggest that the bank managers have frequent contact with the firms and 
carry on stringent monitoring activity on them. 
 
7.1 Measuring Trust 
Trust was measured according to a vector of ten items. The data are reported in table 3. 
The mode is the score 4 (I partially agree) for each item except for the item “The entre-
preneur pays attention to the needs of his/her employee” and “The entrepreneur is very 
involved in the community” where the mode is the score 3 (neither agree nor disagree). 
The average of each item is above 3 which stands for neutral. The lowest average is 
3.08 (“The entrepreneur is very involved in the community”) while the highest is 4.11 
(“The entrepreneur knows very well the market in which he/she operates”). 
As previously illustrated trust is a complex construct: its components interact and help 
jointly the development of trust. The factor analysis of the survey provides a strong 
support to this point: it is very difficult to split trust in its factors. Principal components 
analysis was employed to reduce the vector of ten items which measures different as-
pects of trustworthiness into a smaller number of components of trustworthiness. How-
ever, empirically, the (forced) two and three component models were always sub-
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optimal with Eigenvalues well below 1.0 for all components except the first one (al-
though the items did load as expected on components representing ability, benevolence 
and integrity).  
 
Table 3 – Trust indicators ability, benevolence and integrity (N=457) 
 
Var. Description Mean St.Dev. Factor1 Uniqueness 
ab1 
the entrepreneur knows very well 
the market in which she/he operates  
4.11 
 
.71  0.7268 0.4717 
ab2 
the entrepreneur is able in selecting 
the needed resources 
3.71 
 
.80  0.7139 0.4908 
ab3 
the entrepreneur is able in managing 
the resources 
3.80 
 
.78  0.7764  0.3973  
ab4 
the entrepreneur is able in under-
standing market evolution 
3.81 .78 0.7450  0.4449  
ben1 
the entrepreneur adapts his interests 
to suit those of commercial partners 
3.78 .70  0.7599  0.4226  
ben2 
the entrepreneur pays attention to 
the needs of the employees 
3.54 .75  0.6566  0.5688  
ben3 
the entrepreneur is very involved in 
the community 
3.09 1.17   
int1 
the entrepreneur is totally honest in 
negotiations with commercial part-
ners 
3.88 .72  0.6437 0.5856  
int2 
the entrepreneur is consistent in his 
decisions and behaviour 
3.81 .69  0.7417  0.4499  
int3 
you would be happy to recommend 
to a female friend to work in the 
firm 
3.43 .95  0.7051  0.5079 
 
 
The one component model was superior and had very high reliability. BEN3 (involve-
ment in community) had a low communality and was dropped from the PCA which im-
proved the reliability analysis. PCA was run on nine items (Cronbach Alpha 0.8806). 
The PCA results indicate that perceived trustworthiness in this context appears to be a 
single complex entity that draws on a range of aspects of ability, benevolence and integ-
rity. This is in line with previous research (Nooteboom et al., 1997) that found it diffi-
cult to distinguish empirically between components of trust, particularly benevolence 
and integrity. As a consequence, one factor (TRUST) was extracted from the nine items 
instead of trying to extract three factors (ability, benevolence and integrity). Table 3 
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presents the results of the one component PCA. All variables loaded at 0.6 or more on 
the single component. Factor scores were saved for inclusion in regression analysis.  
 
8. Model Specification 
 
Foregoing literature review identified that there are various factors that could influence 
access to credit for SME. However, our interest in this study is to investigate the role of 
trust in lending decisions while controlling for the impact of other non-trust related fac-
tors. We therefore divide all the identified explanatory variables into three sets of fac-
tors. In first category collects factors exogenous to firm such as location, interest rate, 
competition among banks are included. In second category collateral requirements, eco-
nomic conditions and size (turnover) of firm are included. These are collectively called 
‘hard factors’ as they represent hard information or data. And finally in third category 
includes indicators of the strength of relationship which helps managers form their opin-
ion about trustworthiness of firm. These are length of relationship, frequency of meet-
ings, number of relationship managers and multiple reationships with the bank.  In order 
to investigate our research question following models were used. This approach gives us 
the possibility to verify which vector affects gaining the credit needed independently of 
other vectors. 
 
Exogenous factors 
OVDUSE = β0+(β1LOCNAT + β2INT_OV + β3NBANKS + β4REGION) + ε (Equation 1) 
 
Hard factors 
OVDUSE = β0+ (β5COLLATERAL + β6ECON + β7LNTURNOVR) + ε   (Equation 2) 
 
Relationship factors 
OVDUSE = β0+ (β8LNLENGTH + β9FREQREV + β10FREQMEET + β11MANAGER + β12MULTI  
+ β13TRUST) + ε         (Equation 3) 
Then, in order to investigate the overall impact of different covariates, we uses a the fol-
lowing model where the three vectors are entered together 
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OVDUSE = β0+(β1LOCNAT + β2INT_OV + β3NBANKS + β4REGION) + (β5COLLATERAL + 
β6ECON + β7LNTURNOVR) + (β8LNLENGTH + β9FREQREV + β10FREQMEET + β11MANAGER 
+ β12MULTI  + β13TRUST) + ε 
All the terms used in the above equations are explained in Tables 2. In the following 
section the results from the above analytical models are presented. 
 
9. Testing Credit Constrained - Regression Findings 
 
In table 4 three regressions are presented: the first considers only the covariates exoge-
nous to the firm and to the relationship. The second one, looks only at the firm and fi-
nance characteristics. The thirds one considers only the relationship between banks and 
firms. The number of observation considered is slightly different among the specifica-
tions but the t-tests on different datasets show no significant difference. Interestingly, 
the first specification is not significant at all stressing the fact that the exogenous vari-
ables do not affect credit access. The second specification is significant at 99% (but it is 
borderline) and both firm dimension and whether the credit is collateralised are signifi-
cant even if COLLATERAL has not the expected sign. By comparing the second re-
gression with the first one emerges that firm and finance characteristics impact on gain-
ing the credit the firm needs more than the exogenous general characteristics of the area 
and of the economic context. 
The specification that consider only the relationship variables is very significant and has 
an adjusted R² greater than 0.09. All the variables entered are significant. This finding 
supports the key role of relationship variables and specifically of TRUST in helping 
firms in accessing credit they need. Indeed, this set of covariates is that one that affect 
mainly the satisfactory access to credit.  
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Moving on in the analysis, in table 5 four specification are presented. The first one con-
siders only hard covariates (that is the exogenous variables and firms’ specifics charac-
teristics); the second enter the relationship covariates except TRUST. This gives us the 
possibility to compare the specification results to the findings of previous research and 
test how relationship variables impact on gaining the needed credit. TRUST is entered 
in the third one. By entering it separately we can appreciate how it impacts on the 
model. The last regression is the parsimonious version of the third specification, where 
the covariates that are not significant are dropped. 
Regressions have adjusted R² between 0.0385 and (first specification) and 0.1223 (third 
regression). All the specifications are significant according to Wald chi
2
 test even if the 
first one is significant at 99% while all the others are significant at 99.99%. Missing 
data affects slightly the number of observations in the regressions: indeed MANAGERS 
covariate constraints the number of useful observations to 451. T-tests on the dependent 
variable and firm dimension (LN_TURNOVER) did not show any significant difference 
at 99% level between datasets. The second (and third) specification supports strongly 
the hypothesis: TRUST has the expected sign (negative) confirming the role of trust in 
reducing the situation of being credit constrained and it also maintains negative sign 
(and is significant) in specifications not reported here. By entering relationship variables 
and TRUST, the adjusted R² improves strongly from 0.0385 (first specification) to 
0.1223 (third regression).  
It is interesting to cross analyse the findings of regression in specifications reported in 
table 4 and in table 5. Adjusted R² improvement when relationship covariates and 
TRUST are entered is mainly explained by relationship variables and TRUST than by 
the possible effect this set of covariates have on hard covariates. This point is supported 
by the key role played by relationship variables when regressed as stand alone ones as 
shown in the third regression of table 4. 
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Turning attention to other covariates, competition (N_BANK), COLLATERAL and 
firm dimension measured through LN_TURNOVER are as expected and are significant. 
INT_OV is negatively related to OVUSE as expected but it is not significant, also in 
regressions not reported here. Interestingly, REGION is positively related supporting 
our argument that firms in a region where there is more competition among firms and a 
lower support from local government, leverage more short term credit i.e. it is more 
credit constrained even if its significance is border line. As expected, large banks 
(LOC_NAT) tend to be more restrictive in lending to SMEs forcing them to leverage 
more overdraft. Unexpectedly, when banks decide to apply more stringent criteria in 
providing credit (MKT_PERCEPTION), firms are less credit constrained. The covariate 
is significant. A possible explanation is that general economic outlook affects only par-
tially the banks and possibly only the credit provided to new customers, not to the cur-
rent ones according to a pecking order. The length of the relationship (LN_LENGTH) 
has negative sign and is significant suggesting that longer relationships help firms in 
gaining the credit they need. Information dispersion linked to the number of bank em-
ployees involved in the relationship with the SMEs owners/managers (MANAGERS) 
adversely affect gaining credit even if the covariate is significant but border line. Per-
sonal contact between SMEs owners/managers and bank manager (FREQ_MEET) ad-
versely affects being credit constrained. One possible explanation is that the firm that 
are more credit constrained are considered by the bank riskier and are more monitored 
through frequent contact, even if the significance of the covariate is low. The reviewing 
activity (FREQ_REV) is not significant (and is dropped in the last specification). 
Strangely, relying on the bank for other services (such as payment and collection proc-
ess) does not help the firm in avoiding to be credit constrained (MULTI). 
 
10. Comments on Findings 
 
Present research investigates the role of trust as a determinant in helping firm to access 
the credit they need. Trust is a very complex concept. There are many different defini-
tions of trust and a variety of models that try to explain it and how it works. The present 
research grounds on the framework which states that the formation of trust is mainly 
influenced by the personal predisposition to trust and by three trust factors: ability (the 
perceived competence of the trustee), benevolence (the willingness to be well disposed 
to the trustor) and integrity (the ethics and morals of the trustee) (Howorth & Moro, 
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2006, Mayer et al. 1995). We tested whether high level of trust (ability, benevolence 
and integrity) is positively related to gaining the credit the firm needs. 
The regression analysis shows that trust does have significant impact on the ability of 
firms to access the credit facility. The trust factor seems to guarantee the access to the 
needed credit as hypothesised but some additional comments are needed. In interviews, 
bank managers stated that they have no sector or industry specialisation. In fact, they 
usually deal with a very heterogeneous set of firms. This is a very important aspect 
since it affects at least partially their capability to evaluate thoroughly the information 
provided and to question owners/firms’ managers about the data provided. In addition, 
they clearly state that to value the assets of the firms they need chartered surveyor sup-
port. Thus, presence of knowledge gap about specific sectors in which firms operate and 
lack of the reliability of data submitted in many cases means the subjective assessment 
by managers becomes a deciding factor in lending decisions. Which means that entre-
preneur should share as much information as possible with the managers.  
 
However, the popular perception among owners/managers of small firms seems to be in 
opposite direction. Owners/managers of small firms, usually think that being open with 
the bank (that is, trusting bank managers) may result in adverse impact on their credit 
access or terms of borrowing. The present study provides support to the opposite actu-
ally. Since high level of trust is found to have positive impact on gaining the credit 
needed, SMEs owners/managers should nurture trust. They have to change their ap-
proach towards banks, build up strong relationships and develop trusting relationships 
(i.e. improving the flow of the information to the bank and keeping the bank manager 
updated about the firm’s situation). 
 
Research provides some additional interesting findings on other covariates. Gaining the 
credit the firm needs and the index that measures the prospective credit availability has 
the unexpected sign. However, this issue needs further research. We think following 
observations in this regard may be useful. 
 
The finding provides some support to the fact that banks might insulate SMEs during 
economic downturns from being adversely affected in accessing credit, possibly be-
cause the bank use a pecking order approach refusing credit to new (unknown) custom-
ers instead of reducing credit to the current (known) ones. We suggest that this approach 
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is possible because of Italian banks balance sheet strategies. Generally speaking, there 
are two main models in dealing with collecting funds and providing credit. The first one 
is called originate-to-hold (OTH): the bank provides credit to customers and hold it in 
the assets side of its balance sheet. This strategic approach emerges by simply looking 
at the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets where the largest part of the liabilities are 
savings accounts, certificates of deposit and bonds: they are the financial tools used to 
collect the finance available from savers. This is typically the model used in Continental 
Europe and is at a variant with the Anglo Saxon banking system which relies more on 
originate-to-distribute (OTD) that is provide credit, pack it with other credits and sell in 
the market as some kind of security (the CMBS – commercial mortgaged-back securi-
ties – are one of the most famous examples). In the latter case, the provided credit will 
not be on the assets side of the originator bank but it will be an assets of the financial 
institution who buys it. In OTD strategy, the originator bank’s capability to provide fi-
nance is linked to its capability to raise finance in the financial market selling securities: 
if the financial markets freeze, the bank will be incapable to collect new finance and to 
provide new loans for the firms. Italian banking system relies on OTH for two main rea-
sons. On one hand, the majority of the Italian banks are constrained in their capability to 
collect funds at good conditions in the financial markets (Kashyap, 1998): this is limited 
only to the few largest banks. On the other hand, traditionally, Italian savers are happy 
to invest in very-secure low-return financial tools provided by the banks (savings ac-
counts and certificates of deposits) instead of investing in the stock exchange. Thus, 
Italian banks might be less affected by difficulties in collecting finance in the financial 
markets during economic or financial downturns and they may transfer such a greater 
steadiness of funds on to the current customers according the pecking order approach: 
they guarantee credit even in economic downturn to current customers and constrain 
only the new ones. From this point of view, Ferri et al., (2009) stresses the peculiar role 
played by relationships in accessing credit in harsh times. 
 
11. Conclusions 
 
Present study is an additional step in the research about the role trust plays in the busi-
ness relationship. There is some research that looks at the role of trust in accessing ven-
ture capital, in developing relationships with business angels, in accessing trade credit, 
in getting support from customers and suppliers when starting up or a spinning off a 
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firm. At the same time, there is a poor track record on research about the trust role on 
banking relationships. Paradoxically, when a bank makes a decision to provide credit, 
even though it is a contractual relationship, it is underpinned by an assessment of trust. 
In fact, underpinning the potential creditor’s analysis of the risk return trade-off is an 
assessment of the trustworthiness of the borrower. 
By approaching lending relationship from a different perspective, present research 
opens a new, interesting perspective on lending relationships. It points out that lending 
relationships cannot be reduced to facts and figures because trust (and soft information 
in general) plays an important role in accessing credit. In addition, the role of trust 
might greater and more important for very small marginal firms that lack the capacity to 
provide the facts and figures that large banks ask, and cannot access financial markets 
for either equity or bonds. This fact cannot be neglected since very small firms are the 
real skeleton of the economic fabric of Europe and US, representing the largest part of 
the firms’ population and producing the largest part of the GDP of developed nations. In 
addition, small firms represent the largest majority of the population of firms in devel-
oping countries. 
Explicitly, by leveraging trust, banks can help the growth and development of small 
firms, and insulate the SMEs against the economic downturns. At the same time, SMEs 
owners/managers can only gain real advantages in gaining the credit they need when 
they develop strong, long term and trusting ties with the banks and the bank managers. 
To sum up, bank managers can leverage trust and provide credit if and only if such a 
behaviour is reciprocated by the SMEs owners/managers. 
Present research opens to future research. The first area for further investigation might 
be to test the hypotheses in regions with a different cultural background such as the An-
glo Saxon world where the banking system is largely dominated by large banks and the 
SMEs owners/managers have been used to deal with credit rating/scoring systems since 
the mid ‘90s (and consequently they are used to provide hard information). A different 
but very interesting area for investigation would be to verify whether banks that lever-
age trust have a higher level of risk than those who do not leverage it, i.e. whether lev-
eraging trust in lending relationships implies a greater risk affecting the profitability of 
the bank. According to the small example used in present research, it seems that lever-
aging trust improves banks profitability since the write offs of the banks involved in the 
research is lower than the average. Finally, it is interesting to verify whether the eco-
nomic downturn can affect trust role in lending relationship: on one hand banks could 
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be expected to pay more attention in lending to incumbent and prospective customers 
scrutinizing them thoroughly on fact and figures, irrespective of trusting relationships; 
on the other, consolidated trusted relationship can help the bank in sorting out good and 
band customers. 
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